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IN THE SUPREME

COURT OF THE STATE OF

TUMMURRU TRADES, I N C . ,
Petitioner/Plaintiff,

:
i
Appeal

V.

J

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

J

Respondent/Defendant.

REPLY
1.

UTAH

No. 8 9 - 0 2 0 9

:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT OF
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT

The enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104 (34) (1989) ,

effective July 1, 1989, by the Utah State Legislature does not
require a holding that it has always been constitutional to tax
material purchases used on the construction of out-of-state real
property improvements.
2.

Sales or use tax is not due from Tummurru merely by an

administrative determination by Tummurru that building materials
owned by Tummurru and located within Utah will be used in the
construction of out-of-state real property improvements or will be
used by Tummurru in the construction of components to be used in
the construction of out-of-state real property improvements.

ARGUMENT
1. The enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104 (34) (1989) ,
effective July 1, 1989, by the Utah State Legislature does not
require a holding that it has always been constitutional to tax
material purchases used on the construction of out-of-state real
property improvements.
1

The amendment of the statute described in Madsen v. Borthick,
769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), cited by Respondent/Defendant reflected
a change in the law which the legislature could have enacted at any
time, without any constitutional limitations.
The change in the law in Madsen, supra, related to charges in
the law relating to suits brought against state employees for
actions taken in the course of their employment and did not involve
constitutional limitations.
The Commission is presumably arguing that the enactment of a
statute by the legislature creating a rule of law which could have
been or is not constitutional, creates, by legislative enactment,
a presumption that the rule was constitutional

prior to the

enactment of the statute.
Tummurru submits there is no authority for such an argument.
To the contrary, whether a rule of law (i.e. in this case relating
to sales of tangible personal property to persons within this state
that is subsequently shipped outside the state and incorporated
pursuant to contract into and becomes a part of real property
located outside of this state) is or is not constitutional will be
determined on its own merits.

2. A sale subject to sales or use tax is not created by the
determination by Tummurru that building materials located within
Utah will be used in the construction of out-of-state real property
improvements or will be used by Tummurru in the construction of
components to be used in the construction of out-of-state real
property improvements.
Building materials purchased by Tummurru were not subject to
sales or use tax at the time of purchase from a vendor under the

2

provisions

of

Utah Code Ann.

§ 59-12-102

and Utah Code Ann.

§ 59-12-103, exempting from s a l e s or use tax purchases for r e s a l e .
In Levine v.

State

Bd. of

Equalization

of

the S t a t e

of

C a l i f o r n i a , 299 P.2d 738, 743 (Cal. D i s t . Ct. App. 1956) the court
outlined t h e r a t i o n a l e for t h i s r u l e as follows:
"There are many situations which develop in the ordinary
course of business where the purchaser is unable to determine at the
time of the purchase Aether he will in fact resell the articles
purchased or will use them. The resale certificate provisions of
the law were enacted to permit the purchase to be tax free under
these circumstances until such time as the ultimate disposition of
the property is determined. If that disposition is a resale, in the
form of tangible personal property, then no tax is due with respect
to the original sale. If that disposition is for a use other than
retention, demonstration, or display, while holding i t for sale in
the regular course of business, then a tax is due because the
property was not purchased for resale. . . . "
The Commission presumably argues in i t s Brief (p.19) t h a t an
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e determination by Tummurru t h a t i t would use building
m a t e r i a l s purchased in Utah, then on hand and then located in Utah,
constitutes

a sale,

utilization

or conversion of the

building

m a t e r i a l s t o or with i t s e l f thus o b l i g a t i n g Tummurru t o pay s a l e s
tax a t the time of such a d m i n i s t r a t i v e determination.
The

Commission

also

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e determination,

presumably

argues

that

such

an

as a matter of law, i s a " t i t l e 1 1

t r a n s f e r within Utah ( i . e . in P e t i t i o n e r / P l a i n t i f f ' s

brief,

"The

s a l e between Tummurru, as a Utah wholesaler, and Tummurru, as a
general c o n t r a c t o r , with t i t l e t r a n s f e r r i n g in Utah).
Tummurru suggests t h a t such an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e

determination

by Tummurru does not r e s u l t in the u l t i m a t e use or conversion of
the b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s

and i s

not a s a l e ,

exchange or

other

d i s p o s i t i o n of the property and t h a t no s a l e , exchange or other
d i s p o s i t i o n of the property occurs u n t i l the (1) t r a n s f e r of t i t l e
3

a n d / o r p h y s i c a l p o s s e s s i o n t o an o u t s i d e p u r c h a s e r , o r (2)

actual

physical u t i l i z a t i o n

of

of t h e p r o p e r t y i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n

the

r e a l p r o p e r t y improvements.
The f a c t s i n L e v i n e , s u p r a , a r e c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e

from

those in t h e i n s t a n t case as follows:
a.

In Levine, supra, the actual physical assembly of the

property occurred within the s t a t e .

In t h i s case, the actual

physical assembly occurred without the s t a t e .
b.

In Levine, supra, the property was always tangible

personal property and never became real property, unless,

for

example, by a specific contract between the purchaser-lessee and a
lessor.

In t h i s case, in a l l instances the property did ultimately

became real property and became real property without the s t a t e of
Utah.

CONCLUSION

For a l l of t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , and f o r t h o s e s e t f o r t h
the Brief for the P e t i t i o n e r / P l a i n t i f f ,
Tummurru T r a d e s ,

Inc.,

respectfully

the

Petitioner/Plaintiff,

submits t h e d e c i s i o n

Utah S t a t e Tax Commission s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d .

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s 11th day of May, 1990.

By.

j . jAy eui/nocK, ESQ,
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
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It is argued that the trial court committed error and was guilty of misconduct in
that he told the jury that the overt acts
were "good overt acts". However, examination of the court's instruction in this
connection shows that the court did not
instruct the jury that the overt acts were
good overt acts but stated that overt acts
proven were "good overt acts".

Hyman LEVINE tnd Emma Levinc, limited
partners, Isidore Levine, Sidney Rose and
Sid B. Levfne, general partners, dofng business under the firm names of Santa Ft
Tank & Tower Company, Division of Industrial Manufacturers, Ltd., and Acme
Tank Manufacturing Company, Division of
Industrial Manufacturers, Ltd., a limited
partnership, and Manny A. Rose, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.

[22] Other complaints of appellant as
to the instructions given are likewise without merit. It further appears that many of
the instructions offered by appellant were
covered by other instructions or did not
accurately state the law and no prejudicial
error resulted from the refusal to give
them.
[23] Finally, appellant contends that
the court erred by invading the province of
the jury during its deliberations. No error
appears in this connection. The jury during its deliberations returned to court for
further instructions and at the request of
a juror, the court reread a portion of the
instructions given relative to the question
of the liability of persons charged with a
conspiracy for the acts and declarations
of persons not members of such conspiracy.
The court then informed the jury that a
person who committed a criminal act without having knowledge of a conspiracy
would not be guilty thereof. It appears
that the jury was fully and fairly instructed
on the law applicable to the charges set
forth in the indictment and that the court
did not invade the province of the jury
during its deliberations.
In view of what we have heretofore said,
we deem it unnecessary to pass on other
points raised by appellant. '
The judgment and order denying motion
for new trial are affirmed.

BARNARD, P. J., and G R I F F I N , J.,
concur.

STA -£ BOARD CF" EQL Al t2AT!;7:N - - T State r-f California, DeferCort >rt
Respondent.
Hyman LEVINE and E ~ r ^ Lev-'r.e i-r'"ec
partners, Isidore Levine, Freda Levine, Sidney Rose and Sid B. Levine, general partners, doing business under the firm names
of Santa Fe Tank & Tower Company, Division of Industrial Manufacturers, Ltd., and
Acme Tank Manufacturing Company, Division of Industrial Manufacturers, Ltd., a
limited partnership, and Manny A. Rose,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION of the
State of California, Defendant and
Respondent.
Civ. 21314, 21315.

District Court of Appeal. Second District,
Division 1. California.
July 3, 105C.
Rehearing Denied July 30, 1956.
Hearing Denied An?. 30, 205G.
Two actions for recovery of taxes levied and collected under Sales and Use Tax
Law. The cases were consolidated for trial
in the Superior Court, Los Angeles County,
Ellsworth Meyer, J„ and judgment in each
case went for the defendant State Board
of Equalization. Appeals were taken from
the judgments and the District Court of
Appeal, Fonrt, J., held that where purchasers of materials entered into construction contracts to fabricate and erect structures on real property out of state, the}
were essentially performing services and
were consumers of the materials which
they had purchased and were not engaged
in the reselling of materials as personal
property.
Affirmed.

LEVINX v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
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C i t e a s 299 P.2d 738

1. Licenses C=>I5.I(6)
Under Sales and Use Tax Law as in
effect before 1953 amendments, materials
purchased by California seller under certificates of resale and subsequently fabricated, shipped and erected on out-of-state
job sites pursuant to contracts with out-ofstate purchasers were subject to the tax.
West's Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, §§ 6009.1,
o051, 6091-6094, 6201

Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, §§ 6009.1, 6051,
6091-6094.
5. Licenses C=>32(l)

Resale certificate provisions of Sales
and Use Tax Law were enacted to permit
purchase to be tax free, where purchaser
is unable to determine at time of purchase
whether he will in fact resell articles purchased or will use them, until such time as
ultimate disposition of property is determined. West's Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, §§
6091-6094.

2. Commerce C=64
Licenses C=>15.I(6)
Where materials were purchased by
California seller under certificates of resale and subsequently fabricated, shipped
and erected on out-of-state job sites pursuant to contract with om-of-state purchasers, such sales to California seller were
not exempt from sales and use taxes by virtue of statute relating to property exempted
by Constitution or federal law, nor was state
deprived of jurisdiction to collect tax by
virtue of Interstate Commerce Clause of
federal Constitution. West's Ann.Rev. &
Tax.Code, § 6352; U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 3.

6. Commerce 0=>64
Licenses C=l5.t(6)
Subjection to imposition of taxes under Sales and Use Tax Law of purchases of
materials, purchased by contractors who
gave resale certificates and then subsequently fabricated items which they installed on out-of-state job sites, did not conflict
with Interstate Commerce Clause of federal
Constitution, nor was extraterritorial effect
thereby given to the Sales and Use Tax
Law. West's Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, §§
6009.1, 6051,6091-6094; U.S.C.A.Const. art.
1, § 8, cl. 3.

3. Licenses C==>I5-I(3)

7. Licenses C=>28

Partners engaged in business of constructing tanks and other items which were
fabricated pursuant to contracts and erected
on real property outside the state were,
under facts as shown by the record, ''contractors" within meaning of law of California, and were "consumers" for sales and
use tax purposes. West's Ann.Rev. & Tax.
Code, §§ 6909.1, 6051. 6091-6094.
See publication Words and Phrases,
for other judicial constructions and definitions of "Consumers*" and "Contractors".

Purpose of resale provisions of Sales
and Use Tax Law is to relieve original
seller from payment of sales tax where
property is bought by purchaser for purpose
of reselling it in form of tangible personal
property. West's Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code,
§§ 6091-6095.
8. Licenses C=>!5.l(8)

Legislature did not intend to permit
purchasers to escape entirely, payment of
tax under Sales and Use Tax Law bv giving of resale certificate if it later developed that property was consumed or us<j'l
4. Estoppel C=>92(f)
rather than resold in form oi tangible perWhere contractors in business of fab- sonal property, and. to prevent this pessibi'ricating items avoided immediate payment
Le-i :iturc enacted sectiun relating t<
«»f sales taxes on purchases of materials by the use of article bought for resale. Wcs
giving resale certificates as provided by Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, §5 6091-6095.
statute, they had no standing to attempt
in court to avoid conditions specified in
Wadsworth & Fraser, by E. L. Fraser,
such statute, by reference to other statutes
by
charges
of
inconsistency.
West's
Los
Angeles, for appellants.
and
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Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., James E.
Sabine, Asst. Atty. Gen.. Edward Sumner,
Dan Kaufmann, and James C. Maupin,
Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.
FOURT, Justice.
Appellants brought two actions for the
recovery of taxes levied and collected under the California Sales and Use Tax Law.
The cases were consolidated for trial and
judgment in each case went for the defendant.
One action, Case Number 21314, is for
the recovery of taxes in the amount of 5°.717.17, with interest levied during the period from February 1, 1949, to September 30,
1951. The second action, Case Number
21315, is for the recovery of taxes in the
sum of $1,940.18, with interest levied during the period from July 1, 1948, to January
31, 1949. Except for the taxable periods,
the legal and factual issues in each action
are substantially the same.

performed at Santa Rosa. The items fabricated were either (1) sold and mereh- di livered to the job sites specified by customers, or (2) erected on the customers' job
sites by appellants. Out-of-state shipments
were made by railroad car with appellants
as consignee at the out-of-state job site.
Appellants* erection superintendent took
possession of the shipment upon arrival
and with the assistance of local labor supervised the erection work. No deficiency tax
assessments were made upon out-of-state
sales not involving erection. The busines>
was a specialty in that the items fabricated consisted almost entirely of itemspecifically engineered for a particular customer.
The instant appeals involve tax and interest measured by the price paid by appellants for materials which were purchased
in California, ex tax under resale certificates. The raw materials were first placed
in inventory in California and, as orders
were received for the erection of one of
the completed structures to be manufactured
and installed by appellants, after the design and engineering work was done, the
necessary raw materials were withdrawn
from inventory as required, and fabricated
in California for subsequent erection and
installation by the appellants outside California on customers' job sites. The purchase, storage and fabrication of the materials all took place in this state.

The appellants were engaged in designing, engineering, fabricating, selling and
installing writer cooling towers, aerial towers and industrial wooden products especially designed for industrial processing.
The business headquarters were located in
Los Angeles, and their principal fabricating
plant, storage and lumber yard were located at Santa Rosa, California.
Customers' purchase orders were first Sent to
the Los Angeles office where design and
engineering work was performed. The orders were then forwarded to Sania Rosa,
We are concerned with the provisions e>f
accompanied by requisitions to inventory. the law as it existed during the taxable peFabrication and loading for shipment were riods. 1
I. Revenue and Taxation Code see r ;,,n?:
*'£ U00f».l. What nor included in #>t<>rnjrc" or 'use.' 'Storage" and 'us*-' do n<>t
include the Unpins, retaining or C : ; T eisin^ av.y rijrht or power over tangible
personal property shipped or brought
into tlii< State fur the purp«'>e of subsequently transporting it outride the St..t.»
for use thereafter a^bly or.tsid* the
State, or for the purpose of bein:: processed, fabricated, or niaii"ifa'#ujr.-d into, attn'-hed to or incorporated into, other
tangible personal propi-rty to be transported outside tbe State and thereafter
used solely outside the State."

•'§ 00.11. Imposition v.uCi rate of t::x.
T<'\ tht* privilege of se'i:a.: tar^iiilf p<rs«•!:;»! property at retail a tax i* hej-.-bv
iiapus'Mi up'T. all retailer? o: the r:\\»- of
1M-J percent of the jrruss re«-*-ip!«; «•:'
any retailer from the sale i»f all tan^ib ••'
personal property sold at retail in ta>
State on or after August 1. lO.'t^. nt:d to
and ineludin^ June .'50. M»-T>. and at the
rate of o percent thereafter, and at the
rat" of 2\2 percent on and after .Inly
1. VA4", and to and inehr::r.£ June .*;<>.
VMU, and at tbe rate of V> percent thereafter."

LEVINE • . STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
Cite as 299P.:dT3?
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In 1953, section 6000.1 was amended by

chaser may elect to include in his gress re-

strikinc therefrom the word* "shipped or
brought into this State". In the same year,
section 6094 was amended as follows:

ceipts the amount of the rental charged
rather than the cost sales price of the
property to him/' (Italics indicating addi-

"§ 60:M.

If a purchaser who gives a

tions made to the section.)

certificate makes any use of the property
other than retention, demonstration, or display while holding it for sale in the reg-

Where the purchaser gave a valid rcsale certificate pursuant to sections 60916093, and the gross receipts involved were

tilar course of business, the use shall be
deemed a retail sale by tc.rable to the purchaser under Chapter 3 of this part as of
thc time the property is first used by him,
and the cost sales price of the property to

accordingly not included in the measure of
the sales tax imposed upon the vendor, any
use by the purchaser other than mere re tention, demonstration or display while
holding the property for sale in the regular

him shall be deemed the gross receipts from

course of business was under section 6094 as

such retail sale the measure of the tax.
Only n-hen there is an unsatisfied use tax
liability on tiiis basis shall the seller be
liable for sales tax with respect to the sale
of the property to the purchaser.
If the
sole use of the property other than retention, demonstration, or display in the regular course of business is the rental of the

it read during the period involved herein,
and prior to the section's amendment in
1953, deemed a retail sale by the purchaser
and subject to the sales tax measured by
the purchaser's cost. The amendment of
1953 provided that the use of tangible personal property, other than retention, demonstration or display, for sale in the reg-

property while holding it for sale, the pur-

ular course of business by the one who pur-

"§ C091. Presumption that gross receipts subject to t a x : Burden of proof.
For the purpose of the proper administration of this part and to prevent evasion of the sales tax it shall be presumed
that all gross receipts are subject to the
tax until the contrary is established.
The burden of proving that a sale of
tangible personal property is not a sale
at retail is upon the person who makes
the sale unless he take* from the purchaser a certificate to the effect that the
property is purchased for resale."
••£ f.092. Purchaser's certificate that
purchase for resale: Sufficiency to relieve seller of burden of proof. T 1 K certificate relieves the seller from the burdeD
of proof only if taken in good faith from
a person who is engaged in the business
of selling tangible personal property and
who holds the permit provided for in
Article 2 of this chapter and who, at
the time of purchasing the tangible p- rponal property, intends to s«-11 it in the
regular course of business or is unahh- ro
ascertain at the time of purchase wlo-th^r
the property will be sold or will be used
for sonic other purpose."
'*$ (Mi9.*>. Same: Execution, form, and
contents. The certificate *diall be signed
by and bear the name and address of the
purchaser, shall indicate the number of
the permit issued to the purchaser, and
shall indicate the general character of
the tangible personal property sold by the

purchaser in the regular course of business. The certificate shall be substantially in such form as the board may prescribe."
"§ 0094. Effect of using article bought
for resale. If a purchaser who gives a
certificate makes any use of the property
other than retention, demonstration, or
display while holding it for sale in th*
regular course of business, the use shall
be deemed a retail sale by the purchaser
as of the time the property is first used
by him. and the cost of the property to
him shall be de«-med the gros^ reeripts
from such retail sale. If the sob use
of the property other than retention,
demonstration, or display in the regular
course of business is the rental of the
property while holding it for sale, the
purchaser may elect to include iD hi«=
gross receipts the amount of th* rental
charged rather than the cost of the property t" him."
"$ <>203. Imposition and rate of tax.
An excis< tax is hereby imposed on the
storage, use. or other consumption m this
State of tangible personal property purchase! from arv retailer on or after July
1, 29:;.", for storage, use. or other consumption in this State at the rate of 3 percent of the sales price of the pr*.p'-rry,
and at the rate of 21** percent or. and
after July 3. 3943. and to and including
June 30, 1949. and at the rate of 3 percent thereafter.''

742
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"Respondent argues that it has never been
chased the property under a valid retail
certificate is subject to the use tax imposed the intent or effect of the code provisions
by section 6201, rather than the sales tax to tax the transactions here involved and
refers us to the declaration to that effect
imposed by section 6051.
by
the legislature when it passed the exDuring the times with which we are conclusionary
section 6019. If the existing
cerned, section 1921 of the California Adlaw
taxed
these
transactions, and we hold
ministrative Code, relating to the Board of
that
it
did,
then
the legislature could not
Equalization—Sales and Use Tax (being
change
the
law
by
declaring that it had
formerly known as Board of Equalizanever
intended
to
tax
them.
tion Sales and Use Tax Ruling No. 11), provided in substance as is set forth in the foot" T h e usual purpose of a special interprenote hereto. 2
tative statute is to correct a judicial interpretation of a prior law which the Legis[1] Appellants' contention, in substance,
lature determines to be inaccurate. Where
is that prior to the 1953 amendment, the
such statutes are given any effect, the effect
Sales and Use Tax Law was ambiguous
is prospective only. This seems correct, for
with respect to the taxation of materials
any other result would make the Legislature
purchased by a California seller under cera court of last resort.' (2 Sutherland Stattificates of resale and subsequently fabriutory Construction, third edition, sec. 3004.)
cated, shipped and erected on out-of-state
"In any event the legislature could not
job sites pursuant to contract with out-ofretroactively
change what had been the
state purchasers, and that the 1953 amendlaw
by
declaring
what a preceding legisments to sections 6009.1 and 6094 should be
lature
had
meant
by
what it had said." See,
construed as declaration of existing law.
also, Stockton Savings & Loan Bank v.
Before the 1953 amendment, section Massanet, IS Cal.2d 200, 114 P.2d 592;
6009.1 exempted from the definition of tax- Board of Social Welfare v. County of L. A.,
able storage and use. under certain cir- 27 Cal .2d 90, 162 P.2d 635; California Emcumstances, only the use of tangible per- ployment Stabilization Comm. v. Payne, 31
sonal property "shipped or brought into this Cal.2d 210. 1ST P.2d 702.
State for the purpose of subsequently trans[21 The appellant further contends that
porting it outside the Stale for use therethe imposition of the tax violates the Comafter solely outside the State, * * *."
merce Clause of the United States ConstiIn the case of People v. Grazer, 13S Cal. tution. The initial sales and purchases of
App.2d 274, 291 P.2d 957. 960, the court the materials by the appellants were subject to a sales tax in that the property was
said:
2. The term "Contractor" as used in this
administrative ruling is defined as including both general contractors and subcontractors and including also contractors
engaged in such building trades as carpentry, bricklaying, cement work, steel
work, plastering, sheet metal work, roofing, tile and terrazzo work, electrical
work, plumbing, heating, air '-<>n<iuioimi£,
painting and interior decorating.
The term "Construction Contracts" is
defined as a contract for erecting a building or other structures on land and includes lump-sum. cost-plus and time-andinatcrial contracts.
The term ''Materials" is defined as
tangible personal property which, when
combined with other tangible personal
property loses its identity to become an

integral and inseparable part of the completed structure. The ruling contains a
list of ''materials" such as flooring, insulation, laths, lumber, oil. paint, piping,
valves, pipelinings, putty, rooncg, sheet
metal, steel, vallboard, weath* rstripping.
wood preserver, etc.
The term "Fixtures" is defined as items
accessory to a building and which do not
lose their identity as accessaries when
plarfd «»r insr.-illed. such as lighting fixtures, off.
The ruling specifically provides in subdivision (b) (1) that "Contractors are
the <i»i:<!;i.jer> of materials used by them
in fulfilling construction contracts and
the tax applies to the sale of such materials to the contractors."

LEVTNE v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
Cal
743
Cite as 239 P.?(J 736
delivered to appellants at a point in the the purchase to be tax free under these
state. Such sales were not exempt under circumstances unti] such time as the ultisection 6352 of the Revenue and Taxation mate disposition of the property is deterCode, nor was the state deprived of juris- mined. If that disposition is a resale, in
diction to collect the tax by virtue of the the form of tangible personal property,
Interstate Commerce Clause of the Federal then no tax is due with respect to the origConstitution, U.S.C.A.Const, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. inal sale. If that disposition is for a use
[3] The appellants were engaged in the other than retention, demonstration, or disbusiness of constructing tank? and the items play, while holding it for sale in the regular
heretofore mentioned, which were fabri- course of business, then a tax is due becated pursuant to contracts to be erected cause the property was not purchased for
on real property outside of the state. In resale. However, under these circumstancour opinion they were, under the facts of es, the person who gave the resale certifithese particular cases, contractors within cate is required to pay a tax at the rate of
the meaning of the law of this state, and the sales tax, but measured by the cost of
were consumers. It was said in General the property to him. The legislature apparElectric Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, ently felt that it was fair to impose a tax
111 CaLApp.2d ISO, 187, 244 P.2d 427, 431: on the purchaser under these conditions
" * * * Where the materials are com- because the seller could have collected rebined with other materials so as to lose imbursement for the tax from the buyer,
their identity and become part of the com- except for his reliance upon the resale cerpleted structure the contractor is deemed tificate.
to be the consumer of
* * *»

such

materials

[4] But for the giving of resale certificates, the sales tax would have applied at
the rime of the sale of the raw materials to
the appellants. By giving the resale certificates appellants escaped reimbursing their
sellers for the sales tax at the time of the
initial purchases and sales. Such certificates relieved the seller of tru obligation
initially to pay the sale? tax and thus there
was n o necessity for the sellers to collect
sales tax reimbursement from the appellants
as buvcrs. Having elected to accept the
\ Chaptc 2. Division
co: ditjons of Artie
2 of the Revenue and Taxatioi e oje-, sectior.s 6091—6095, relative to resale ce•rtincates, the appellants are in no positi i to
attempt to avoid the conditio
oi t? *i "Artide by reference to other rov-si ms in
the Code and bv charges o:
tencv.
[51 There are many situations which
develop in the ordinary course of business
where the purchaser is unable to determine
at the time of the purcha.-c whether he
will in fact resell the articles purchased' or
will use them. The resale cer
provisions of the law were enacted to permit

[6] The appellants, in the instant cases,
both stored and fabricated the materials in
California, pursuant to construction contracts; they were not merely retaining
these materials, demonstrating them or displaying them while holding them for
sale in the regular course of business.
Furthermore, since all of these events took
place in California and were preliminary
to the actual shipment of the structures,
there can be, in our opinion, no application
of the Interstate Commerce Clause of the
Federal Constitution. Southern Pacific Co.
v. Gallagher. 30b U.S. 267, 59 S.Ct. 38°.
S3 L.Ed. ?S6; Utah Power & Light Co.
v. Pfost. 286 U.S. 165, '-2 S.Ct. 548, 76 L.
Ed. 103S; American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis,
250 U.S. 45!'. ?l> S.Ct. '-22, 63 L.Ed. 1084.
In other words, the appellants cannot use
the resale certificate sections to strip the
state of its jurisdiction merely because the
ultimate and final use of the property took
place in another state as part of the continuing process of contracting.
Appellant? further contend that extraterritorial effect is being given to the California Sales and Use Tax Lav. in these cases
in that the contracting work was performed outside of the state of California.

744

Cal.

299 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

The actual erection of the structures was
only a portion of the contracting agreement The agreement to erect the structures establishes the nature of the activitics of the appellants as a contractor. However, all of the incidents with "which the
infant cases are concerned, insofar as they
involve the applicability of the California
Saks and Use Tax Law, are incidents
which occurred in California. The property was bought and delivered in California
and a sales tax would have been paid but
for the giving of the resale certificates;
it was stored in California, it was determined that it would be dedicated to the performance of a construction contract and it
was removed from storage in California,
then fabricated in California, that fabrication consisting of the rendering of contracting services transforming the raw materials into the completed struc f ures prior
to their being shipped outride of the state
for erection pursuant to the construction
agreements

related the tax back to the initial purchase
to the extent that that purchase price is
controlling as to the measure of the tax
There is nothing in sections 6091-6095 to
indicate that the legislature intended in am
way to relate these particular provision*
of law to problems dealing with interstate
commerce.
The appellants further argue that because the Board did not tax the sale of materials by the appellants in knocked-down
form to be delivered without erection at the
out-of-state job sites, that the Board was
inconsistent in taxing the materials fabricated into structures in California pursuant to a construction contract calling for
erection of the structures in other states
They further argue that in all cases thev
were merely selling pergonal property and
should come within the Board's rule that
jrross receipts from sales to manufacturer*,
producers or processors of tangible personal
property which becomes an ingredient or
component part of the tangi* le pergonal
property which they manufacture, produce
or process are not taxable
Where the
appellants had no construction contract bur
were merely selling their materials to purchasers ou*-of-state. they were reselling
personal property But where they entered
into a construction eortract to fabr,ca # e
and erect struct r es on real property, they
were essentially performing services
As
to the construction contracts they we r e
the consumers of the materials which t v e \
had purchased They were not reselling
these materials as personal property, but
were rather using them m the process of
fulfilling a construction contract, and thu*
fall within the provisions of Board rule Nu
11.

[7,8] Article 3, Chapter 2, Division 2
of the Revenue and Taxation Code relates
entirely to resale certificates The pu^po-e
of the provisions of sections 6091-6 *95 is to
relieve the original seller from the payment
of sales tax where the property is bought
by the purchaser for the purpose of rebelling it in the fe.rm of tangible personal
property
ObwoL^ly, the leg'slature did
not intend to permit part es in this type of
transaction to escape payment of a ta-\
entirely b> the grwng of a resale certificate
if it later developed that the property was
consumed or used rather than resold in the
form of tang'ble persona 1 prot>erty
To
prevent thfu po cc ib*litv r the lesr^a'ure enacted section 609-* Once it is established
that the property is not to be resold in the
Judgment afr-med
form of tangible personal property then the
tax is due and payable since the salts tax
was not paid at the time of the original
W H I T E , P J , and DOR \ X , J , concur
sale. The legislature has required that the
Hearing denied. SCH \ L E R and M .
purchaser must now pay the tax, but has COMB, JJ M dissenting

MADSEN v. BORTHICK

Utah 245

ate M 769 T26 243 (Ttafa IMS)

Richard D. MADSEN and Nancj Madsen,
Boyd A. S*en»en and Beatrice S* engen, Blaine Anderson and Sheree
Anderson, Hope A Hilton, Cvnthia Hilton, Ralph M Hilton, Gene Helland and
the Middle East Foundation, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,

Minin D. BORTHICK, W. Smoot Brimhall, and John Does I to V, being former Commissioners of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 19704.
Supreme Court of Utah
Dec 12, 1988
Rehearing Denied March 10, 1989

Investors brought suit against former
Commissioners of Department of Financial
Institutions individually claiming their
gross negligence resulted m loss of their
investment The Third District Court Salt
Lake Count}, David B Dee J dismissed
on grounds of res judicata sovereign lm
mumtv and statute of limitations On appeal the Supreme Court Zimmerman J
held that (1) res judicata was not apphca
ble (2) Government Immunitv Act dia rot
applv and (3) suit was not time ban*ed due
to extension of statute of limitations b>
dismissal of pnor suit
Reversed and remanded

1. Judgment <§=>540
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action
onlv if suit in w hich that cause of action is
being asserted and pnor suit satisfv tnree
requirements both cases mv oh e same par
ties or their pnvies, claim which is alleg
edly barred must have been presented m
first suit or must be one that could have
and should have been raised there and
first suit must have resulted m final judg
ment on the ments

2. Judgment «=>570(4)
Since trial court, m dismissing earlier
action between investors and State Department of Finance Commissioners officially,
could not legitimately pass on ments of the
complaint, because plaintiffs had failed to
satisf) statutory notice requirements which
were a precondition to suit, claim preclusion did not prevent plaintiffs later suit
against Commissioners individually Rules
Civ Proc, Rule 41(b)
3. Pretrial Procedure £=>554
Dismissal of suit for "lack of jurisdiction" for failure to compl) writh rules of
civil procedure and court orders includes a
dismissal for failure to meet a precondition
to suit Rules Civ Proc, Rule 41(b)
4. Pretrial Procedure @=>554
Plaintiffs failure to meet notice requirements under Government Immunity
Act w as a failure to fulfill a precondition to
suit, and thus dismissal of such action was
for lack of junsdiction U C A 1953 6330-11 63-30-12 Rules Civ Proc Rule
4Kb)
5. Judgment <s=*634
Under rules of issue preclusion adjudi
cation of an issue bars its relitigation in
another action if issue in both cases was
identical judgment was final with respect
to that issue issue was full) fairlv and
competent!) litigated m first action and
pam who is precluded from litigating the
issue was either a part) to the first action
or a pnv) of part)
6 Judgment c=702
Since unaer law applicable in 1980,
State did not have a dutv to mdemnifv
Commissioners of Department of Financial
Institutions m suit brought agams: them
for activities ansmg out of their duties but
onlv had dutv to defend them plaintiffs
were not required to ule notice of claim
agamst officer with State pnor to bringing suit agamst Commissioners mdniduallv
under the Act thus' pnor dismissal of suit
against Department and Commissioners official!) did not have issue preclusive effect
on later suit bv same plaintiffs agamst the
Commissioners mdividuallv
U C A 1953,
63-30-11, 63-30-12 UCA1953 63-48-2

w
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to 63-4&-4, S ^ f r - ^ , 3), 63-48-8(1-4) (Re
pealed).
7. Statutes *=»212.5
Amendment to a statute is presumed
to have intended to change existing legal
rights.
8. Statutes $=>206
In interpreting statutes, Supreme
Court had fundamental duty to give effect,
if possible, to every word of the statute.
9. Officers and Public Employees $=>116
Later amendment of Government Immunity Act, granting officials immunity
even for gross negligence which arose in
course of their duties was substantive
change of law and did not retroactively
apply and bar citizens' suit for officials'
actions which predated amendment. U.C.
A.1953, 63-30-1 et seq.
10. Limitation of Actions <£=*130(5)
Upon date of affirmation of dismissal
of timely first action, statute of limitations
was extended for one year in which to
allow plaintiffs to file a second action.
U.C.A.1953, 78-12-26(4), 78-12-28(1), 7812-29(2), 78-12-40.

now-defunct Grove Finance Company ("the
investors"), brought suit against defendants Mirvin D. Borthick and W. Smoot
Brimhall, former commissioners of the
Utah Department of Financial Institutions
("the Commissioners"). The investors seek
to recover the amount of their lost investments from the Commissioners personally.
The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of the Commissioners, basing
its ruling on several alternative grounds.
The court held that the doctrine of res
judicata barred the action, that the Commissioners are immune from suit under the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and
that the applicable statute of limitations
bars this action. The investors challenge
all of these legal conclusions. We agree
with the investors that the trial court's
ruling was incorrect and reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings.

Daniel F. Bertch, Robert J. Debry, Phillip
B. Shell, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and
appellants.
David L. Wilkinson, Paul M. Warner, Stephen J. Sorenson, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellees.

In Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627
(Utah 1983) [hereinafter Madsen / ] . the
plaintiffs in the instant case sued the State,
its Department of Financial Institutions,
and its Commissioner of Financial Institutions, Mirvin D. Borthick, in his official
capacity, claiming that they had lost most
of their investment in Grove Finance when
it became insolvent and that its insolvency
was due to the defendants' failure to perform their statutory duties.1 658 P.2d at
627-28. The trial court dismissed that case
for "failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted" because the investors, in suing the State and state officers in
their official capacities, had failed to file
the statutorily required notice of claim
within the aliened time. Id at 628; see
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -12 (Supp.
1979). This Court upheld that dismissal.
658 P.2d at 633.

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Plaintiffs Richard D. and Nancy Madsen,
Boyd A. and Beatrice Swensen, Blaine and
Sheree Anderson, Hope A., Cynthia, and
Ralph M. Hilton, Gene Helland, and the
Middle East Foundation, all investors in the

In our opinion in Madsen /, we indicated
that one reason for affirming the trial
court's dismissal was the investors' failure
to sue Commissioner Borthick in his individual capacity. See ia\ at 632-33. Absent
an allegation that he had "acted or failed to
act through gross negligence, fraud or mai-

1. For a more detailed account of the factual
background of this case, see Madsen v. Borthick,

653 P.2d 627, 628-29 (Utah 1983) [hereinafter
Madsen / ) .

11. Limitation of Actions e=»118(2)
For purposes of determining timeliness
of suit, suit is considered filed by filing of a
criminal complaint or service of summons,
not by filing of a notice of claim, where
that notice is a precondition to suit. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 3(a).
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that this language should be ignored, that
we should look instead to the 1983 amendment of section 63-30-11, which deleted
this language and had the effect of expressly requiring service of a notice of
claim on the State in all suits against employees, whether or not any judgment
might ultimately be payable by the State.
They argue that the 1983 amendment was
intended to clarify the earlier statute and
to bring it into conformance with the legislature's true intention in enacting the earlier version of the statute.

gross negligence, fraud, or malice—in other words, an action brought against an
employee in an individual capacity. Moreover, the only possible import of the final
sentence of the second paragraph of section 63-30-11 is that there must be some
suits brought under the Act against employees of which the State need not be
notified. Unless we are to ignore that sentence entirely, the 1980 version of section
63-30-11 is more plainly read to expressly
except from the notice of claim requirement suits against employees in their individual
capacities. If this were not enough
[7,8] The Commissioners are correct in
to
undermine
the Commissioners' position,
concluding that the effect of the 1983 delewe
find
no
indication
in the 1983 amendtion of this language was to leave only the
ment
or
elsewhere
that
the amendment
first paragraph of the section, which rewas
intended
to
clarify
a
preexisting
intenquires that a notice of claim be filed with
11
tion.
For
these
reasons,
we
conclude
that
the State in all suits brought against state
in 1980, section 63-30-11 did not require
employees for actions taken in the course
one suing state employees in their individuof their employment. We also agree that if
al capacities to file a notice of claim with
the State has a statutory duty to defend
the State. Therefore, the issue preclusion
employees in all such suits and if the
branch of the doctrine of res judicata canState's duty to indemnify is defined as ennot support the summary judgment.
compassing its dun* to defend employees,
the statutory provisions relating to the no[9] Having rejected res judicata as a
tice requirement and to indemnification are basis for the summary judgment, we next
more coherent since the 1983 amendment consider the correctness of the trial court's
was made. However, we need not consider ruling that the Commissioners are immune
whether the legislature can properly char- from suit under the Governmental Immunity Act. The investors point out that the
acterize the duty to defend as a duty to Act, as it read at the time the cause of
indemnify, for we find no suggestion in action arose in 1980, granted the Commissections 63-48-2 through -4 that it intend- sioners no immunity from personal liability
ed to do so. Those provisions clearly state for gross negligence committed in their
that there is no duty to indemnify by pay- individual capacities. 1 2 The Commissioner omission which occurs during the performing a judgment awarded in an action for
11. The Commissioners have made no persuasive
argument for disregarding the presumption that
an amendment is intended to change existing
legal rights. See 1A N Singer, Sutherland on
Statutory Construction § 22.30 (Sands 4th rev.
cd. 19S5). Furthermore, in asking us to rule
that an entire sentence of the statute had absolutely no meaning ai ail. the> have ignored our
fundamental dutv to give effect, if possible, to
every word of the statute. See Totoncc v.
Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175 178, 397 P.2d 9S4, 9S7
(1965); Stevenson \. Sal: Lake Cit\, 7 Utah 2d
28, 31, 317 P.2d 597, 599 (1957); 2A X. Singer,
Sutherland on Statute^. Construction § 46.06
(Sands 4th rev. ed 1984).
12. At the time this cause of action arose, section
63-30-4 of the Code provided in pan as follows*
The remedy against a governmental entity
or its employee for an injury caused by an act

ance of such employee's duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authority is, after the effective date of this act,
exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding b> reason of the same subject matter
against the employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim, unless the employee acted or failed to
act through gross negligence, fraud, or malice.
An employee may be joined in an action
against a governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for which the governmentaJ
entity ma> be liable, but no employee shall be
held personally liable for acts or omissions
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority, unless it is

